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13 
A term “legal positivism" is not popular or familiar to citizen in Japan， but a 
special technical term for law scholars and lawyers. In speaking of it， moreover， 
they have very often used it in some special connotation. For instance， ideas that 
one need not be afraid of condemnation by others whenever he strict1y observes any 
given laws， 01' that lawyers and scholars of law can sufficiently resolve al possible 
legally involved p1'oblems whe1'ever any definite system of laws is presented before 
them， may fair1y se1've as its i1ustrations. We have been very accustomed to see them 
cited unde1' the name of legal positivism， and yet confronted with special criticism， 
“that' s why legal positivism is to be swept out." Such a usage of the te1'm， according 
to the connotation above， rathe1' seems to imply something like， legal mind 01' legal thi-
nking which believes in laws and o1'de1's given by state or political powe1' as almighty， 
t This is a part of translation，. though a bit modified in the content， ofmy article， Legal 
Positivism (狂句isshoshugi)，in: Series of Law in Contemporary World (Gendaiho・koza)，Iwanamト
shoten， vol. 13. As to the legal positivism， 1 have written a book and several articles， by changing 
aspects to deal with the subject (cf. Note 1)， 3)， 9)， 10). At this time， the article is particu1arly 
concerned with legal thinking in Japan. 
ホ Professorof General Jurisprudence， Law Department， Osaka Univ，巴rsity.
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which is， consequently， tobe named “confirmed" or “hard boi1ed". It particularly 
resembles the usage in modern France，“culte du texte de loiぺor“fetichisme legal". 
Actual1y， 1 wonder if the term legal positivism might be exhausted in this way of 
usage.1) But， as it is the usage mentioned above which has been generally found 
in the fie1d of law in Japan at present， 1 would lik巴toexamine this hard boi1ed or 
confi.rmed legal thinking in regard to its logic and socio-cultural background underly-
ing it， with reference to a few cases， atlast to reconsider whether this usage is really 
adequate to express the term legal “positivism" or not， inorder to c1arify its signi-
ficance in our contemporary wor1d. 
A Few Cases 
One of the most striking cases as far as 1 rememb町 isa writer， Miss. Taiko 
Hirabayashi's remarks in newspaper， May 9th， 1957.2) Her remarks were made 
twice in the same day， morning and evening， and yet on the ground of diametrically 
opposed arguments. As it was a great issue that the Public Corporation， Etc.， 
Workers Union's strike in that Spring came to be strict1y regulated by government 
with the pressure of dismissal， warning， etc. of the leaders， her remarks naturally 
were directed to this issue. While she pointed out in morning that Public Corpora酬
tion， Etc.， Labor Relations Law (Kδrohδ)， asreferred by government as rationalizing 
govermental decision is sti11aw， even though it might be unreasonable in the content， 
consequent1y law is to be observed， her opinion in evening was that law is not to be 
observed， only if it may be unreasonable. As we see， itis very surprising that she 
changed her opinion from one extreme to the other in the same day. Especially， 
what interests us is her morning opinion that law is strictly to be observed， regardless 
of its content -whether reasonable or not -， and that strict obServance of any 
given laws is the thing to do for us， since we are under the rule of1aw. It is probable 
that such an opinion itself implies the confirmed or hard boil巴dlegal mind. Only 
her remarks have been often cited as a surprising case， because she criticized for 
1) As to the detail， se Yasaki， Legal positivismreconsidered， written in Eng1ish， Osaka 
University Law Review， No. 11， 1963， p.18 f. 
2) Taiko Hirabayashi， Law is to be observed even though it may be iniquitous in the corト
tent (此凶lomo shitagawanebanaranu)， Tokyo newspaper (Tokyo・shinbun)，May 9， 1957. lni-
quitous Iaw is to be overcome (Akuho"to tatakau hokanai)， Yo~iuri newspaper (Yomiuri-shin-
bun)， evening edition， May 9，1957. Why have 1 changed my opinion in a single night 何'atashi
wa naze ichiya de setsuo kaeta ka)? Tokyo newspaper， May 14， 1957. 
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herself h巴rconfirmed IegaI positivism in evening， while she convincingly held it in 
mornmg. 
To consider it a bit more deeply， however， itis not only the cas巴forher. A 
term “Rechtsstaat"， or "rule of law" does not necessary mean that people ought 
to obey laws given there， regardless of its content， and I think， there may be a pos帽
sibility of“critical" observance of any given laws.3) Nonetheless，such an idea of 
“strict" observance of any given laws which insists people strict1y to obey any laws 
as far as they were given under the name of Rechtsstaat or rule of1aw istended to be 
domina，nt， that is actua11y problematic. 
Let me cite another example. On May 12白， 1964， one sent a telegram at Beppu 
telegram 0茄cein豆yushuto his family， saying that“as I am going to die today， 
please take care of everything after my death". Indeed， two and half hours Iater， 
he made a suicide by diving under the running train. A newspaper reported this 
accident under the tit1e: “Which is more important， either sanctity of human life 
or secret of correspondence ?"4) What was at issue is whether the suicide might be 
beforehand prevented or not， ifthe 0飽ce，in doing its business， informed beforehand 
the matter to the authority. In other words， asfar as Iife of human being is con-
cerned， the cruciaI point is why the 0盟cecould not do its business not only from the 
viewpoint offorma1Iogic oflaw， butfrom moraI point ofview. The 0伍ce，however， 
rationalized its treatment about the matter under the name of observance of Art. 
21， Consitution of Japan concerning secrecy of communication and of Art. 5， Law 
of Public Business of Communication by Means of Electricity concerning with the 
same content. The implications of this case are surely delicate. It is obviously 
misleading if we might conc1ude from this case that people participating in public 
busuness of this sort should anytime inform the content of each communication 
to the authority. In this sense， the 0盟cein their argument and rationalization 
has somewhat reasonableness. But， itmust be stil1 a bit doubtedぜtheremight 
not be a kind of opportunism，“It's a1 right only if observing laws." Therefore， 
even though we need not find a typical hard boiled legal positivism in this case， 
but it is stil1 relevant to us that there is an idea to suggest the existence of 
3) H.L.A. Hart， Positivism and the separation of lawand morals， Harvard Law Review， 
vol. 71， 1958， p.618 f. As to the recent discussion on the subject， se S. Hook (1巴dみLawand
philosophy， 1964， p.3-101. Yasaki， Legal positivism， written in Japanese， publ. byNihonhyoron-
sha， 1963， p.204 f. 
4) Asahi newspaper (Asahi・shinbun)，May 14， 1964. 
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bureaucratic opportunism concerned with the thinking above. 
On the other hand， there may be another type of illustration for such a legal 
thinking， saying “because of no legal provision". It is the cant which is often used 
when the public 0自cerejects citizen's reasonable and sincere ask or argument. 
Such an idea also may well be called an idea of the reverse side of a coin， that is， the 
hard boiled legal positivism. 
As an illustration， let me cite a Supreme Court's decision，5) 1959. It is the 
case concerning with the result of the labor movement of the Whole Public Business 
of Correspondence Workers Union， the central issue of which is how to treat 
the matter of discovery and raised the keen di宜'erenceof opinions between the 
practicing attorney and the public procurator. While the practicing attorney 
required the procurator to show him a11 kind of evidences in the procurator's posse-
ssion， the procurator rejected this requirement on the ground that as he showed the 
practicing attorney al materials which are supposed to be presented and examined 
as evidences relevant to this case in the court， he needed not do furthermore. In 
front ofthis conflict， the District Courtjudge advised the procurator that he is better 
to show the practicing attorney materials which may be possible to examine as 
evidynces on the ground of Art. 321 and 328， Law of Criminal Procedure， even 
though the procurator at present was not intended to do so. But， the situation 
was not st迎 changed. At last， by using his competence to conduct as a chief judge， 
he made a order， saying that the procurator ought to make the practicing attorney 
to look at al kind of evidences in his possession in order to find mater包1justice. 
It was very unacceptable to the procurator. That is why there happened the special 
appellation of the procurator and the Supreme Court's decision. 
The Supreme Court's opinion involved， tosum up， isas follows: The decision 
of Osaka District Court is against to the judicial precidents， and yet it is not appro-
priate to give the procurator a duty being not prescribed by existing Law of Criminal 
Procedure， according1y， itis to be repea1ed. To refer the context a bit in detail， 
the following part is relevant. It is sure that the procurator have a duty to realize 
materia1 justice， incooperating with the judge as well as being a participant in this 
case. But， itis to be judged by legal propositions of Law of Procedure whether he 
furthermore is 0 
5) Decision of Dec. 26， 1959， Supreme Court. A colI巴ctionof criminal Supreme Court 
cases， vol. 13， No. 13， p.3375. Y. Nakabu， Discovery， in: Series of Law of Criminal Procedure， 
vol. 2， 1964， p.263 f. 
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evidences regardless of his actual intention to present them as evidences or not， but 
since there is no legal provision providing such a duty， the District Court can not 
duly make the decision in such a way mentioned above. The opinion， therefore， 
is reduced to the conclusion that because of no legal provision， the decision comes 
to be unjust. What amounts to the same thing， only considering it from the other 
side of a coin， the conclusion means that we can't help to do so due to any prescri-
ption of legal provision， and that， speaking in an extreme way， we can do everything 
only if based on the prescription of legal provision. Supreme Court decision， 
certainly， doesn't express such a opinion. But， examining its opinion， 1 think， there 
may be a possibility of implication of this sort. If so， we may well to say that 
within the opinion lies a kind of the hard boiled legal mind. 
But this is the case concerned with the criminal (procedural) law. It is a wel1 
known fact and indeed important to know that interpreter is required more strict1y 
to be bound by frame of legal provisions in the :field of criminal law rather than 
the other. Therefore， we don't blame every type of1egal thinking placing an emphasis 
on observance of1aws. Such a thinking may well be said relevant to practioners and 
theoreticians of laws in order to secur巴fundamentalhuman rights from abuse of 
political power as well as to prevent themselves. from their arbitrary discretion of 
lagal provisions. But， how about this case? The c巴ntralissue here is that the 
procurater is better to show the practicing attorney the evidenc巴:sin his posession， 
for the purpose of fair attack-defense to be held between them， and yet to speak 
. principal1y， for the pu1'pose of :finding of matel'ial justice， which is very basic fo1' Law 
of Criminal Procedure. Seeing in this light， the attitude of th巴decisionputting aside 
straightly such a central issue on1y because of no legal provision to subsume t1<巴
case is to be reexamined. Here we may :find something else， far beyond legal thinking 
merely to emphasize on 0 bservance of laws， that is， the hard boiled legal positivism. 
Accordingly， itis remarkable that within the same scope of the con企nnedview 
point of law there is a di宜erencein a considerable degree. For instance， ifsomeone 
usc the cant“because of legal provision prescribing to do so"， he is intended to 
rationalize as possible as extensibly by this legal provision whatever he decide， whi 
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happen in a society based on somewhat popular attitude of supremacy of civi1liberty， 
meaning of the cases， too， might be large1y changed into the moderate direction. 
These are， however， cases happened in Japan. The more we know here demand 
of civilliberty having not always and strongly been raised and developed in a spon-
tanious way within a folk in general since Meiji era， the more we are afraid if the 
confirmed view point of laws also has not played a worse and dangerous role in 
modern period of Japan. I think naturally， the point of view may have another 
aspect of role remote from the worse and dangerous.6) If so， itcomes much more 
urgent to examine its social and intellectual background as wel1 as its logic. Then， 
why has it been blamed and criticized in Japan? 
The Hard Boiled Legal Positivism and Socio-Cultural Tradition in j apan 
Late Prof. IZl凶1託ta訂rδ Sueh耐iroi担nhis pap 巴町r
M 巴吋ijie釘raぷ"pointed out as fol1ows: ‘“寸Thestate was intended to become the sources 
Oぱfmorals or folkways， furthermore to unify even religion under its control" so that 
“people lost al1 of their original and critical powers under the heavy pressure of the 
state"， because “they came to think of the state and its laws are almighty and the 
best".7) In this short paper his keen insight clear1y fitted the central feature of 
the social conditions in Meiji， which the confirmed view point came from and criticism 
ofwhich was the task ofhis sociologicaljurisprudence. But， asto the origin ofthis 
legal thinkig， itis worth to pay attention the fact of acceptance of German law and 
legal thinking in Japan and of codification being advanced. The fact seen approxi-
mate1y since 1900 was very symbolic for direction of development oflegal thought in 
Japan， by showing the rise of the German legal thinking in contrast with the fal1 of 
the French and English in Japan which were very infl.uencial in the preceding period 
here. 
6) Imagine an emergent situation when judge argues that he can not give a sentence of 
imprisonment more than ten years for the accused on the ground of Iegal provision， whlIe a group 
ofleaders want to inflict upon hlm death penaIty onIy because they dislike for him. See M. Takaha-
shi， Accident of Feb. 26 (Ni-nirok吋iken)，1965， p.185 f. 
7) 1. Suehlro， A Iie issometimes expedient (Uso no Koyo)， 1954， p.62. As to detaiIs of 
the matter， se Tetsu 1somura， Modem Iegal theory in Japan (Shiminhogaku)， in: Series of history 
of moedem development of law in Japan， Keisoshobo， voI. 7， p.31， 85. To speak exactly， though 
this exceIlent article in print is devided into vo1. 7，9， 10， itis numbered consecutively as to pages 
through each volumes. 11 citing this articIe below， 1 shaIl use this special page number. 
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Then， why was it symbolic and d己cisive? It comes from the fact that the German 
legal thinking was accepted here， including its socal1ed legal positivism of conceptual 
jurisprudence. The term conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz) which 
R.v. Jhering8) named the specific feature of German legal thinking at that tIme in 
a caricatualized sense， presupposing that each legal provisions as a whole constitute 
a selfconsistent and les心ontradictorylegal order (or system)， accordingly this 
legal drder comes to be an absolutely reliable means to resolve a111egal problems， is
usual1y summarized in the logical formula that by subsuming a fact as the minor-
premise under a legal provision as the majorpremise， a conclusion as a decison 
de白litelyis deduced in a syl10gistic way (as it's well known， the formula resembles 
to late Prof. J. Frank's R(ule) X F(acts )=D( ecision)， which may be very familiar in the 
U.Sふ Thelegal thinking of this sort， being originated in the former half of 19th 
century Germany theoreticians or thinkers of law， like C. F. Puchta， C. F. Gerber， 
was advanced and developed within a circle oftheoreticians in the latter half of 19th 
century there， especial1y W. Windscheid in civi11aw， P.Laband in public law， K. 
Beigbohm in philosophy of law. 
Incidental1y， however， inthe latter half of the 19th century Germany it was an 
actual necessity to unify the states in particularism under a nation state and to unify 
their laws into wel1 arranged codes (codification)， and yet it was indeed， though 
part1y， realized since Bismarck government so that the theoreticians mentioned above， 
too， tended to hold a view seeing law and laws altogether as nothing but enactments 
of a nation state or political power. A typical representative of this id巴ais mainly 
Bergbohm， but suchis also the case with the others.9) It may well be cal1ed a 
positive law minded position which， by placing a special emphasis on the political 
power， identifi巴slaws enacted by political power as a positive lawand yet the positive 
law as law in general. While it has be巴ngenerally cal1巴d“legalpositivism"， 1 think 
here is a cause of misunderstanding as 1 wi1l refer to it later. The legal thinking of 
this sort， placing a special emphasis on statute or state laws， is， tosum up， the hard 
boiled legal thinking -in using Mrs. Shklar's term，10) legalistic -The German 
legal theory accepted in Japan was thus accompanied by such a legal positivis 
8) R.v. Jhering， Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz， 1884，52 Autl.， 1921， S.347. 
9) Yasaki， Legal positivism， Nihonhyoronsha， p.179 f. 194 f. Legal positivism， in: 
Series of legal philosophy， vol. 4， 1957， YUhikaku， p.219 f. 
10) J. Shklar， Legalism， 1964， p.1 f. Yasaki， Some comment on legal positivism and legalism， 
written in English， Osaka University Law Review， No. 13， 1965， p.4 f.
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conceptual jurisprudence which 1 cite below， for the convenience， asthe hard boi1ed 
legal positivism. 
Authority Minded Legal Thought 
To examine legal thought in Japan， itmust be moreover kept in mind that a 
tendency to imagine the state being almighty was deve10ped here. Seeing from 
this aspect， the state was intended to extend its legal and yet powerful control not only 
for citizen's external behavior， but for their internal attitude. Thus， itcomes a 
basic feature for the state to be guardian or paterfamilias. Speaking of the law in 
Japan， itis natural to see that the law was given a role not only to be command of 
sovereign but to control and lead citizen's behavior even in regard to their internal 
worldl1). As to this point， 1 wil1 refer to an idea of late Prof. Shinkichi Uesugi 
soon later. Here the law's fundamental character is deduced from an authority 
of the state as a paterfamilias as well as its formal character owes its justification to 
political (or legislative) power. Therefore， itcomesto be apparent that legal theory 
in Meiji era， generally sp巴aking，was based on an authority minded legal thought 
and it was given a method by the hard boi1ed legal positivism. 
The authority血indedlegal thought has been explained above with refer百 lC巴
to the speci宣cidea of the state of Japanese at that time， but it doesn't mean that 
European's legal thought of legalistic content has not been accompanied by such an 
element. To il1ustrate familiar examples， Roman legal propositions，“princeps 
legibus solutus est"， "quod principi placuit legis habet vigoremヘorEmperor 
Justinian's attitude prohibitting to make commentaries on Corups Iuris Civi1is in 
an arbitrary way seems to show us such e1ements in existence. As to the modern 
period， the same is the case with Emperor Napoleon's saying when he was given 
a chance to see a commentary on the Code Napoleon，“Mon Code est p巴rdu!"or 
Frederick the Greate's attitude to dislike lawyers in Germany at that time， mainly 
because of their formalistic (or mechanical) interpretation and application of laws. 
Here we are faced with a series of authority minded legal thought which gives a 
special emphasis on authority of ruler in order to deduce authority of the law from 
it. What is more relevant in the modern West， however， isto look at the douhle 
11) Isomura， op. cit.， p.30 ff.86. T. Kawasbima， Society in Japan constructed by family 
cbaracter (Nihon Shakai no Hoteki Kosei)， 1950， p.19 f. 
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character of the matter that while such an authority minded thinking or absolutism 
was decisive to make the hard boi1ed legal positivism possible in existence， a trend 
of assertion on civi1liberty based on the growth of civi1 society at that time， too， 
had a same role of this sort. What amounts to the same thing， while authority 
minded thinking did so by believing in laws as an authorized entity without no 
weakness since these were given from the above (von oben heraus)， liberal attitude 
emphasyzing on civi1liberty did so by holding a view that the more laws are an 
expression of general wi11 of citizen (J. Rousseau!)， an indispensable means of civil 
五berty，the more laws are to be complete in order to prevent citizen from abuse 
of political power. 
It was in 19th century when the situation had been step by step changed to give 
an emphasis on civi1liberty. Now， the sate comes to be a formally rationalized 
mechanism (Anstalt) in function， laws themselves， too， had been given a role to 
fucntion as an order as a part of such a formally rationalized mechanism. Even 
though the state and its laws had been given a great significance， itis to be kept in 
mind that， generally speaking， they restrainted themselves to interfere in privat巴or
internal concerns of citizen. The reason， part1y， comes from the fact that function 
of laws， inother words， functions of administration and administration of justice 
were required to be calculated like a machine， since modern capita1ism under‘lying 
them was possible to develop itself on1y by standing on the ground of rational calcula-
tion as pointed out by M. Weber.12) If so， itis also desirable for the law to put 
aside from its function what is hard to calculate like citizens private concern or 
internal attitude -Remember the socalled separation of law and morals -There慣
fore， there were quite enough socio-cultural conditions in the modern West to 
make it possible for scholars and citizep. to desire for well arranged system of laws 
in a sense of formal-rationality， accordingly to believe in such laws as command 
of sovereign or as complete entity without any gaps and weakness 伴is泊deedthe 
cult of1aws enacted by the state)， while the idea ofthe state as a moral or ethical entity 
and its laws eligible to interfere with pri可i'ateconcern or internal attitude of citiz巴n
became gradually super:fiuous and replaced by the liberal attitude arising from the 
process of rationalization. J. Bentham's idea may we1 
12) M. Weber， Gesammelte politische Schriften， 1920， S.142 f.
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desired for a complete code of constitution， etc.13) But such is not the case in Japan. 
The idea of the state and its laws decisive1y influenced by guardian or paterfami1ias 
viewpoint has not been yet died out he1'e， but， furthermore， itwas givena considerable 
meaning by many scholars as 1'e1evant elements in their legal thought. This does not 
make an exception even for late Prof. Tatsukichi Minobe， who is well known as a 
liberal in regard to his theo1'Y and who himself criticized such an idea，14) Even view-
ing the matter from this aspect， itmay be apparent how an authority minded 
attitude has been in貧uencialand yet given a strong impact on legal thought in Japan. 
The Hard Boiled Legal Positivism and Modern Capitalism 
Thus， the hard boiled legal positivism in Japan has been brought up under and 
backed up by the authority minded legal thought， but such an involved situation， 
it is worth to noticing， corresponds to an economic situation at that time. On the 
one hand， Japan in Meiji era has surely went along the way of capitalistic rationaliza-
tion， that is， modernization. It is the simi1ar situation to the modern West that 
there developed freedom of private prope1'ty and contractin corresponding to goods 
exchanging relation in capitalism and there was advanced codification which was 
required to secure such an actual fundamental legal institution. It is also similar 
that civillibe1'ty has been gradually gua1'anteed and the hard boiled legal positivism 
has b巴endeve1oped， incorresponding to the ideology， the“complete" code as it 
ought to be. On the othe1' hand， there has been stil1 dominant the view seeing the 
state as almighty and the authority minded legal thought. It was the Imperial 
Speech on Education (Kyoiku・chokugo)which gave an typical expression fo1' this 
type of view， control through the state，1S) In the economic system， too， socalled 
civilliberty has been admitted to enter in the fie1d of relation fo1' citizens with one 
another， but it was very hard to do so in the fie1d of labo1' re1ation， landlo1'd-tenant 
relation so that semi-feudal 1'elations we1'e stil1 maintained and became obstac1es 
13) J. Bentham， Works (Bowring edふvol.II， p.209 f.F. Neumann， The democratic and 
the authoritarian state， 1957， p.37. 
14) T. Minobe， Essays on recent constitutional probl巴ms(Sai組nKc巴nporon)，1903， Jitsugyo・
nonihonsha， p.320. Isomura， op. cit.， p.59. H. Wada， Judicial decision on administrative 
problems (Gyoseisaiban)， in:Series ofhistory ofmodern development oflaw in Japan， vol. 3，1958， 
p.124. 
15) T. Ishida， Studies ofhistory ofpolitical thought in Meiji era (Meiji Seijishisoshi Kenkyn)， 
1954， p.37 f. 
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to the capitalistic rationalization passing into. That is why， and it is very presumable 
that， the sate as a paterfamilias， by depending upon the semi-feudal relations them-
selves， tended to delimit the scope of civilliberty as possible as he could. It is the 
striking fact that the hard boiled legal positivism has been strongly influenced by 
double character， civic or liberal on the one side， semi-feudal on the other. 
Under the circumstance of this sort， even though it has appeared to make the 
rule of law possible， the hard boiled legal positivism actually has been forced to 
serve as an ideological instrument for control through the state as paterfamilias， so
to speak， for rationalization of bureaucratic discretion of the 0伍.cethere. We may 
find now its typical expression in the legal thought of late Prof. S. Uesugi who took 
for granted the interference of the Emperor State government with citizen's internal 
attitutde， while. he was proud of himself as a successor of legal positivism of con-
ceptual jurisprudence in Germany (especially Laband's).16) Certainly he worked 
in the field of pulic law， such is also the case principally in the field of private law 
though there are a few features making exceptions which may come from a speciality 
ofpr・ivatelaw and legal thinking. Here is a historicallimits of the hard boiled legaI 
positivism in practice as wel1 as in theory in Meiji era. The situation， however， 
changes with the times， especially during the Taisho era. The reason mainly comes 
from the fact that the double aspects of the economic system， by passing through the 
economic crisis， have been gradually faced with contradictions in the capitalistic 
society， especially labor problems and tenant problems (both of them are called 
together a social problem) which in turn haye come to shake fundamentally the 
society itself. It comes more and more di鐙cultfor lawyers and scholars of law 
merely to deal with logic and concept of laws regardless of an actual reality in 
change， asdone by the hard boiled legalpositvists. Before directly examining the 
problem of this sort， however， 1 would like to cite a case happened at the end of the 
Meiji era as an epilogue of this paper. 
Ichirin Case 
The case is often cited as“Ichirin" case. Ichirin is a special term to express 
a minimum amount of money within a monetary system at that time， which we have 
16) S. Uesugi， New lectures on constitution， (Shin Kenpojutsugi)， 1925， Yuhikaku， p.50・1
and its Introdllction (Jobun)， p.13. Isomura， op. cit.， p.19. 
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no more， far les than a coin in the U.S. It is the case concerning a person who 
was accused on the ground that he consumed for himself tobacco leaves equivalent 
to Ichirin， against the legal provision of the former Tobacco Monopoly Law (invalid 
at present) prescribing that who cultivates tobacco leaves is to serve the government 
with leaves， and unless doing this， he is liable to a fine. The accused also acknowledg-
ed the fact.While the Koso-in (the former Court of Appeal) gave a judgement of 
guilty about this case on the ground that consumption of tobacco leaves for himself 
is c1early against the law， regardless of any amount of consumption， large and small， 
the Daishin-in (the former Supreme Court) acquitted of the charge byannulling the 
judgemenL 17) 
As far as the Kδso・inadhered to the view that the consumption is stil the con-
sumption violating the legal provision， accordingly the accused is liable to a fine， it
reminds us immediately the hard boiled legal positivism placing a special emphasis 
solely on laws given by state， and yet it also resembles the national (or state)包terest
minded legal thought as far as adhering to the presupposition that the consumption 
against the Tobacco Monopoly Law is at the same time an act violating the state in 
regard to its right to make profits. In this sense， this is an example ofthe hard boiled 
legal positivism based on the bureaucratic， authority minded legal thought. The 
Daishin-in's judgement， however， exhibits a striking contrast to this. According to 
its judgement， itis rather against the spirit of tax laws to punish such a mere trifling 
violation with a fine even by wasting time and money. It asserts moreover， such 
is also the case with misdeed of human being. Since， the more misdeed is light， the 
more harmless， this is well to put out from a control of laws. An idea or attitude 
underlying in this judgemellt is very intersting. It remillds us， tosome extellt， an 
utitlitarian or empirical approach to the law. After that， we may perhaps imagine 
a series of critical approach following， like civil liberty millded jurisprudence， 
furthermore sociological jurisprudence. What is relevallt to consider here， however， 
is the fact that evell such trellds of1egal thought have beell very often in Japan accom-
panied by an unexpected companion， that is， the hard boiled legal positivism based 
on the authority m担dedlegal thought. 
17) Judgement of Oct. 11， 1910， Daishin-in. A colection of cr加inalDaishin-in cases， 
vol. 16， p.1620. 
